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In Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education,' the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled for the first time that federally-funded schools discriminate on
the basis of sex when they respond with deliberate indifference to known
sexual harassment by students in their education programs. The ruling
built upon the Court's prior decision in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent
School District,2 in which the Court rejected agency principles as a basis
for school liability when a teacher sexually harasses a student, and instead
based liability on the school district's own actions once it had notice of the
harassment. Both decisions interpreted Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, a federal statute that prohibits discrimination on the
basis of sex in education programs and activities that receive federal funds.'
One of the most interesting and potentially significant aspects of the
Supreme Court's decision in Davis is the Court's analysis of why a
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. J.D., Harvard
Law School, 1990. Many thanks to Martha Chamallas and Jules Lobel, who read and
commented on earlier drafts of this essay. Thanks also to Marc Nuzzo for his excellent
research assistance with this article. Any errors, omissions or oversights are entirely my
own.
1. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
2. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
3. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000). Specifically, Title IX provides that: "No person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance .... Id. Congress clarified the broad scope of the
statute in 1988, by enacting the Civil Rights Restoration Act, which rejected the Supreme
Court's program-specific interpretation of Title IX and instead codified its understanding
that all school programs and activities must comply with Title IX if any of its parts receive
federal funds. 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2000); see also Deborah Brake & Elizabeth Catlin, The
Path of Most Resistance: The Long Road Toward Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics,
3 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POLICY 51, 59-60 (1996) (discussing the history and effect of the
Civil Rights Restoration Act).
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school's inaction in the face of sexual harassment by students should be
treated as discrimination by the school. Why is it discrimination on the
part of the school when students are the ones engaging in the harassment?
In other contexts, the Court has been reluctant to hold institutions
responsible for enabling or reinforcing discrimination that is more directly
perpetrated by others.4 Yet in Davis, the Court held that schools are liable
for damages under Title IX whenever they have actual notice of sexual
harassment by students and respond with deliberate indifference At the
same time, the Court emphasized that schools are liable for damages under
Title IX only when the school itself has engaged in intentional
discrimination.6 Thus, the Court took the view that school inaction in
response to known sexual harassment is a species of intentional sex
discrimination by the school, without regard to the actual intentions of
school officials In so ruling, the Court rejected alternative liability
standards that would have required schools either to engage in differential
treatment or to act with a discriminatory animus in such cases. This aspect
of Davis deserves further attention, as it provides a valuable opportunity for
rethinking the meaning of discrimination more generally.
This essay seeks to explain the Davis case as an interpretation of
discrimination that notably and correctly focuses on how institutions cause
sex-based harm, rather than on whether officials within those institutions
act with a discriminatory intent." In the process, I discuss what appears to
be the implicit theory of discrimination underlying the Davis decision: that
schools cause the discrimination by exacerbating the harm that results from
sexual harassment by students. I then explore the significance of the
deliberate indifference requirement in this context, concluding that the
standard, for all its flaws, is distinct from and superior to a search for
discriminatory intent. The final section offers a brief analysis of what
Davis could mean for discrimination law more broadly if courts seriously
4. See discussion infra Section III.
5. 526 U.S. at 650.
6. See id. at 640-42.
7. Because the Court has permitted damages under Title IX only for intentional
discrimination, as opposed to disparate impact discrimination, the Court's decision to allow
the plaintiff's claim to go forward in Davis was necessarily a determination that the school's
actions amounted to intentional discrimination and not simply disparate impact
discrimination. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992)
(permitting damages claims under Title IX in actions for intentional discrimination); cf
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 597-98 (1983) (ruling that Title VI
does not support a damages action for disparate impact discrimination, but suggesting that
damages would be available for intentional discrimination).
8. This essay is in large part an elaboration of an argument presented in a previous
article on sexual harassment and anti-gay harassment in schools. See Deborah Brake, The
Cruelest of the Gender Police: Student-to-Student Sexual Harassment and Anti-Gay Peer
Harassment Under Title IX, 1 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 37 (1999) [hereinafter Gender Police].
That article also presented a "gender policing" theory for why peer sexual harassment itself
occurs on the basis of sex under Title TX-an issue not further considered here.
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applied the insights embedded in the Davis case. i
I. DISCRIMINATION AS CAUSATION OF SEX-BASED, HARM
AND THE REJECTION OF A DISCRIMINATORY INTENT
REQUIREMENT
The Davis Court adopted a broad understanding of discrimination, one
focused not on intent but causation, and a broad view of causation at that.
The discrimination principle that the Court settled upon was not inevitable,
nor was it the only interpretation before the Court. Three alternative
standards had emerged in the lower courts for determining school liability
in peer harassment cases prior to Davis, each of which was rejected by the
majority in Davis.
One alternative, adopted by some lower courts, treated peer harassment
as a harm perpetrated solely by students, for whose actions schools are not
legally responsible.9 Under this approach, school liability was governed
exclusively by agency principles, and since student-harassers do not act as
agents of the school, schools were not liable for peer sexual harassment.
The Davis Court easily rejected this analysis, explaining that the claim
seeks to hold schools accountable for their own action (and inaction) in
response to harassment by students, not for the conduct of other students."
The Davis Court's approach finds strong support in scholarly criticism and
analysis of the Court's state action case law. Commentators have long
argued that the state action doctrine should not insulate the state from
scrutiny for the action (or inaction) that it has taken and that the state
always "acts" at some level, even if merely to enforce the background rules
that shape private conduct." Rather than ending the analysis after
9. See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1395 (11th Cir.
1997) (en banc) (characterizing the plaintiff's claim as "seeking direct liability of the Board
for the wrongdoing of a student"), rev'd and remanded, 526 U.S. 629 (1999); Rowinsky v.
Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1010, 1016 n.9 (5th Cir. 1996) (responding
negatively to the question, "whether the recipient of federal education funds can be found
liable for sex discrimination when the perpetrator is a party other than the grant recipient or
its agents"); Garza v. Galena Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 914 F. Supp. 1437 (S.D. Tex. 1994)
(dismissing Title IX peer harassment claim because the harasser was a student and not a
school employee); see also Morse v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 154 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir.
1998) (reversing the unpublished decision of the lower court that had dismissed a peer
sexual harassment claim on the grounds that the harassing student was not an agent of the
university).
10. 526 U.S. at 641.
11. See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., Forward: "State Action," Equal Protection, and
California's Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L. RnV. 69, 109 (1967); Robert J. Glennon, Jr. &
John E. Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action"
Requirement, 1976 SuP. CT. REv. 221, 228-30; Harold W. Horowitz, The Misleading
Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REv. 208, 208-
209 (1957); William W. Van Alstyne & Kenneth L. Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REv. 3,
7 (1961); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 935, 967-68 (1985).
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determining that the private party acted independently of the state, the
critique continues, courts should analyze and evaluate the state's actions (or
failure to act) under the relevant anti-discrimination principle. 2  By
applying Title IX to the actions that the school took or failed to take, the
Davis Court essentially followed this approach. Once it resolved the
objection that peer sexual harassment claims would hold schools
responsible for the actions of others, the Court next considered whether the
school's own conduct in response to harassment by students constituted
discrimination under Title IX.
In answering this question, the Court rejected two alternative
interpretations of discrimination that were narrower than the one the Court
settled upon in Davis. One approach that some lower courts had adopted
prior to Davis required plaintiffs to prove that the school itself treated male
and female harassment victims differently in order to establish that the
school's response to peer sexual harassment violated Title IX. The most
prominent example of this type of reasoning is found in the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School District, which held that
a school discriminates on the basis of sex by ignoring a student's complaint
of peer sexual harassment only if it would have responded more favorably
to a harassment victim of the other sex.'3 Under this standard, if a school
treats all sexual harassment victims alike or if there were no comparison
group of similarly situated persons of the other sex (perhaps because no
males had complained of sexual harassment), the plaintiff would not
succeed in a Title IX claim against the school. Thus, a school that ignored
sexual harassment complaints across the board, regardless of the sex of the
complainant, would not be liable for discrimination under Title IX.
The Davis Court rejected such a constricted comparative approach.
Instead, the Court found that a school discriminates on the basis of sex
when it knowingly decides "to remain idle in the face of known student-on-
student harassment," regardless of whether it would treat harassment
victims of the other sex more or less favorably . The Davis Court's
disagreement with Rowinsky's narrow interpretation of discrimination is
12. See, e.g., Black, supra note 11, at 109. For example, Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948), in which the Court found state action in the state enforcement of private racially
restrictive covenants, has been extensively criticized for its tortured effort to find state
action in the private covenants, instead of asking whether the state's enforcement of the
private contracts violated equal protection. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 11, at 966-68
(discussing extensive scholarly criticism of Shelley).
13. 80 F.3d 1006. See also Piwonka v. Tidehaven Indep. Sch. Dist., 961 F. Supp. 169,
171 (S.D. Tx. 1997) (following Rowinsky and dismissing plaintiff's claim because she failed
to allege that the school district treats male and female sexual harassment victims
differently); Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1235 (10th Cir. 1996) (dismissing male
student's claim that school created a hostile environment by failing to respond adequately to
sexually charged locker room attack by other male students because plaintiff failed to allege
that the school treated him differently based on sex).
14. Davis, 526 U.S. at 641.
[Vol. 12:1
Winter 2001] SHIFTlNG FROM INTENT TO CAUSATION
easily explained. The Court has long rejected the notion that
discrimination against persons of one group can be cancelled out by
discrimination against persons of another group.'5 If a school discriminates
on the basis of sex when it ignores the sexual harassment 'of female
students, the discrimination does not disappear simply because the school
also ignores sexual harassment of male students.
The harder question at issue in Davis is why school inaction (or
insufficient action) in response to the sexual harassment of any student-
male or female-discriminates on the basis of sex. In answering this
question, the Court rejected yet another approach that had taken root in the
lower courts prior to the Davis decision, one that grounded the school's
discrimination on school officials' intent to discriminate on the basis of the
student's sex. Most lower courts prior to the Davis decision had required
plaintiffs to prove that the school's inadequate response to the harassment
stemmed from a sex-based discriminatory intent. Some of the more
plaintiff-friendly courts that took this approach were willing to presume
that an inadequate response to harassment was necessarily motivated by
sex bias. 7 However, even courts that were willing to skimp on proof of
discriminatory intent found the theoretical basis for the school's liability to
rest on existence of an intent by school officials to harm students on the
basis of their sex.
Thus, at the time the Court decided Davis, those lower courts that
recognized peer sexual harassment claims under Title IX analyzed the
school's discrimination in terms of its differential treatment of male and
female students, either in the way it actually treated harassment victims or
in its discriminatory reasons for failing to remedy the harassment. Davis
implicitly rejected both of these approaches and adopted a different
interpretation of why a school discriminates on the basis of sex when it
15. Although the courts have treated such symmetrical treatment as formally equal and
non-discriminatory in the past, see, for example, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896),
this approach has long been discredited. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
16. See, e.g., Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1205 (N.D.
Iowa 1996) (Plaintiff must show that "the school district selected a particular course of
action in responding to her complaints of sexual harassment at least in part 'because of her
sex."'); Franks v. Kentucky Sch. for the Deaf, 956 F. Supp. 741, 748-49 (E.D. Ky. 1996)
(Plaintiff must show school intended to discriminate against her because of her sex, but such
intent may be inferred from the school's inadequate response where it knew or should have
known of the harassment.); cf Oona, R.-S. v. McCaffrey, 143 F.3d 473, 477 (1998)
("[N]either the employers under Title VII, nor the school officials under Title IX, are
vicariously liable for the actions of others. Rather, they are liable for their own
discriminatory actions in failing to remedy a known hostile environment.").
17. See, e.g., Doe v. University of II., 138 F.3d 653, 663 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that a
school's refusal to take prompt and appropriate action in response to known sexual
harassment "is presumably, perhaps even necessarily, a manifestation of intentional sex
discrimination. After all, what other good reason could there possibly be for refusing even
to make meaningful investigation of such complaints... ?").
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chooses to ignore peer sexual harassment.
As a starting point, the Court agreed with the school district and the
court below that the school itself must discriminate on the basis of sex in
order to be liable in a damages action for peer sexual harassment under
Title IX.'" To decide whether the school "discriminates" in such cases, the
Court turned to the language of Title IX, framing the question in terms of
whether a school that ignores or responds inadequately to peer sexual
harassment "'subject[s] [persons] to discrimination under' its 'programs or
activities."" 9  The Court concluded that a school subjects students to
discrimination when it is deliberately indifferent to peer sexual harassment
that "take[s] place in a context subject to the school district's control," and
the school has authority to take remedial action.' Thus, schools face
damages liability "for 'subject[ing]' their students to discrimination where
the recipient is deliberately indifferent to known acts of student-on-student
sexual harassment and the harasser is under the school's disciplinary
authority."2' Notably, the Court's language is the language of causation,
not intent or motive. In the words of the Court, in order for a school's
deliberate indifference to "subject" students to discrimination, it "must, at a
minimum, 'cause [students] to undergo' harassment or 'make them liable
or vulnerable' to it."'22 Yet, despite the Court's repeated reference to the
importance of causation, it stops short of explaining how school inaction
"effectively 'cause[s]"' the discrimination when the immediate perpetrators
are students rather than school officials. 3 In one sense, a school's failure to
stop any activity may be said to "cause" the resulting harm; were it not for
the school's failure to stop the offending action, the resulting harm would
not have occurred. The key question in Davis is how school inaction
"causes" the harm of the harassment, aside from simply failing to stop its
occurrence.
Although the Court did not explain its reasoning with respect to the
18. The Court found this requirement applicable to both government enforcement actions
and private actions because of the statute's focus on the actions of recipients of federal
funds. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 640-41. However, while the requirement that the school itself
must discriminate applies to private lawsuits for injunctive relief and government
enforcement actions, as well as to private actions for damages, the Court's deliberate
indifference standard, which is discussed below, applies only to private actions for damages.
19. Id. at 641 (quoting Title IX).
20. Id. at 645.
21. Id. at 645-46.
22. Id. at 645 (quoting dictionary definitions that define the word "subject" as "'to cause
to undergo the action of something specified; expose' or 'to make liable or vulnerable; lay
open; expose' and "'to cause to undergo or submit to: make submit to a particular action or
effect: EXPOSE"'). The Court did not appear to interpret the terms "'subjecting' students
to discrimination" differently from "discrimination" itself; thus, the Court's reasoning
defines "discrimination" as much as it defines the "subject[ion]" of someone to
discrimination. Id. at 643 ("whether viewed as 'discrimination' or 'subjecting' students to
discrimination...").
23. Id. at 642-43.
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causation issue, its conclusion that the school's response "causes" the
discriminatory harm finds substantial support in the reality of peer sexual
harassment. When a school reacts indifferently to sexual harassment by
students, despite notice of the harassment, the school "effectively
'cause[s]"' the discrimination in two ways: (1) it intensifies the harm
inflicted on harassment victims and (2) increases the likelihood that the
frequency and severity of the harassment will escalate.'
Perhaps even more so in schools than in the workplace, the failure to
intervene in response to sexual harassment compounds the harm inflicted
by the initial harassment.' Because students perceive the adult world as
more powerful than their own and view school officials as influential over
student affairs, the failure to intervene is seen as approval, rather than a
neutral lack of discipline or a simple failure to control the environment.26
The lack of response to harassment occurs in an environment where student
conduct and activities are highly regulated, making the school's failure to
punish the harasser all the more conspicuous. The school's failure to act is
particularly harmful when, as is often the case, it is accompanied by
messages of blaming the victim, trivializing the conduct or dismissing the
harassment as "normal."27  Students who have experienced peer sexual
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., NAN STEIN ET AL., SECRETS IN PUBLIC: SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN OUR
SCHOOLS 15 (Center for Research on Women at Wellesley College and NOW Legal
Defense Fund, March 1993) [hereinafter SECRETS IN PUBLIC] ("In too many cases, the
school's 'evaded curriculum' teaches young women to suffer harassment and abuse
privately. They learn that speaking up will not result in their being heard or believed and
that if they insist on pursuing matters, they will be on their own."); cf. Martha Chamallas,
Writing About Sexual Harassment: A Guide to the Literature, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 37,
47-78 (1993) (discussing literature explaining the harms to sexual harassment victims in the
workplace when they find their credibility challenged and their injuries minimized).
26. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae NOW-Legal Defense and Education Fund et al., at
15, Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (No. 97-843) ("Students
recognize that adults often witness episodes of sexual harassment, and expect adults to see
and feel these violations as they do. Yet, many students (particularly the girls) cannot get
confirmation of their experiences from school personnel because most of those adults do not
name it 'sexual harassment' and do nothing to stop it."') (quoting NAN STEIN, INCIDENCE OF
SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN K-12 SCHOOLS 35 (Hamilton Fish Nat'l
Inst. on School and Community Violence 1998)); see also Leading Cases, Title IX-School
District Liability for Student-on-Student Sexual Harassment, 113 HARV. L. REv. 368, 376
n.63 (1999) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (stating that, "[t]he harm of the harassment... is
compounded by the school's failure to respond seriously to student-on-student sexual
harassment," and citing research showing that "such inaction officially sanctions the
discrimination in the eyes of the victim and teaches the victim not to speak up"); cf.
Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1,
(2000) (arguing that the expressive content of government action, rather than the subjective
intent of the actor, should be the defining consideration in evaluating potential violations of
the Equal Protection Clause).
27. See, e.g., Doe v. University of Ill., 138 F.3d 653, 655 (7th Cir. 1998) (complaint
alleged that "some administrators suggested to Doe that she herself was to blame for the
harassment, and that it was she who ought to adjust her behavior in order to make it stop,"
and that one administrator in particular "told Doe and two of her friends to start acting like
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL
harassment first-hand often speak of how the reactions of school officials
affected them as much, if not more, than the harassment itself.28 The
effects of school actions that ignore, trivialize or condone the harassment
comprise a "secondary injury" to harassment victims in addition to the
impact of the harassment itself.29 In this way, school indifference to sexual
harassment, and the lack of a serious response to it, enhances and
intensifies the harm of the harassment itself.30
In addition to inflicting additional harm on harassment victims, school
inaction also causes the discrimination in another way: it invites escalation
of the harassment and emboldens the harasser.' For example, in the Davis
case, the frequency and nature of the harassment escalated over a five-
month period after the school failed to take remedial action to stop it. Had
the school reacted swiftly to convey to the harasser that his conduct was
unacceptable, in all likelihood the harassment at issue in the Davis case
,normal' females and scolded them for making allegations of harassment that might injure
some of the male students' futures"); Davis, 526 U.S. at 635 (complaint alleged that when
plaintiff reported sexual harassment to the principal, he asked "why she was the only one
complaining"); Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64, 69, 75 (D. N.H. 1997)
(plaintiff felt "betrayed by the Londonderry Jr. High School administrators and the
Londonderry School District," where superintendent responded to her complaints with the
attitude that "boys will be boys"); cf. CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WORKING WOMEN 52 (1979) ("Trivialization of sexual harassment has been a major means
through which its invisibility has been enforced.").
28. See Brake, Gender Police, supra note 8, at 56-57.
29. Sumi K. Cho, Converging Stereotypes in Racialized Sexual Harassment: Where the
Model Minority Meets Suzi Wong, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 177, 179 n.12, 201-208
(1997) (discussing "secondary injuries" to discrimination victims when their complaints are
met with intimidation, discouragement and disbelief by their institutions); see also
MICHELLE A. PALUDI & RICHARD R. BARICKMAN, ACADEMIC AND WORKPLACE SEXUAL
SEXUAL HARASSMENT 50 (1991) (discussing the tendency of educational institutions to
trivialize sexual harassment as "personal relation issues outside the control of the institution
and unrelated to its own powers and prerogatives"); S. Riger, Gender Dilemmas in Sexual
Harassment Policies and Procedures, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 497-505 (describing how
university reporting procedures for sexual harassment can stigmatize harassment victims
and reinforce their position of powerlessness); Nan Stein, Sexual Harassment in School: The
Public Performance of Gendered Violence, 65 HARV. EDUC. REV. 145, 148 (1995) ("Girls,
and sometimes boys who are the targets of sexual harassment find that where they report
sexual harassment or assault, the events are trivialized, and they, the targets, are
simultaneously demeaned and/or interrogated. This lack of intervention is de facto
sanctioning the students who sexually harass, and essentially encouraging a continued
pattern of violence in relationships, additionally conveying a message to those not directly
involved that engaging in such behavior is acceptable.").
30. The harm from school inaction may also spill over to other students not directly
targeted by the harassment, thus exacerbating a sexually hostile environment generally.
31. The connection between the propensity to harass and the institution's response to
harassment is supported by the organizational model of sexual harassment, which views
sexual harassment as the result of an organization's vertical hierarchy, authority structure
and climate. See generally B.W. DZIECH & L. WEINER, THE LECHEROUS PROFESSOR:
SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS (1984) (contending that "sexual harassment is a by-
product of an organization's climate, hierarchy, and authority relations including diffused
institutional authority, as well as a lack of accountability and mutual respect for professional
autonomy").
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would have ended rather than escalated. Instead, the school's failure to act
supported the harasser in his course of conduct? When school officials
look the other way in the presence of peer sexual harassment, harassers
learn that their actions are "normal" and within the bounds of acceptable
behavior." This lesson is not confined to harassers. School inaction is
perceived as condonation by harassment victims, other perpetrators and
persons who witness or hear about the harassment? The net effect can be
to foster a school environment where peer sexual harassment is an expected
norm of student interaction.
The harms of school inaction-the secondary harm to victims and the
encouragement to harassers-occur regardless of whether the school acted
out of a discriminatory intent or animus?. The Davis Court's holding
implicitly recognizes the importance of the interconnection between school
inaction and the harms of peer harassment and holds schools accountable
for the harms that they inflict on students when they remain deliberately
indifferent to known peer sexual harassment in their programs?6
I1 THE DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE REQUIREMENT AND
ITS ROLE IN THE DISCRIMINATION ANALYSIS
The above discussion contends that the Davis Court interpreted
discrimination to include institutional conduct that causes students to be
subjected to discrimination on the basis of their sex, regardless of the
intentions of officials within that institution. In addition, the Court applied
a very broad standard of causation in this context, holding that schools
cause the discrimination by exacerbating the harm of sexual harassment
inflicted by persons within the institution's control. Yet, after Davis,
32 Cf Valerie E, Lee et al., The Culture of Sexual Harassment in Secondary SchooL, 33
Am. Enuc. RES, 1. 383 (1996) (contending that peer sexual harassment is best explained by
the school culture surrounding sexual harassment, rather than by individuals or society at
large),
33 See SECRETS rN Pu uc, supra note 25, at 15 ("At the same time, and as a result of the
same [school] silence, boys in school often receive tacit permission to intimidate, harass and
assault girls, Indeed, if school authorities do not intervene and challenge the boys who
sexually harass others, the school may be encouraging a continued pattern of violence in
relationships."); see also Le et al., supra note 32, at 406 ("Students experience more
harassment, and more severe forms of it, in schools where they describe harassment as a
serious problem.").
34. Cf Doe v. Petaluma City Seh. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1427 (ND. Cal. 1996) ("In
addition to the curriculum, students learn about many different aspects of human life and
interaction from school. The type of environment that is tolerated or encouraged by or at a
school can therefore bend a particularly strong signal to, and serve as an influential lesson
for, its students."),
35, Cf MACKINNON, supra note 27, at 39-40 ("Whatever they mean, people who do not
take sexual harassment seriously are an arm of the people who do it."),
36. See Susan Fineran & Larry Bennett, Gender and Power Issues of Peer Sexual
Harassment Among Teenagers, 14 J. OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLEVCE 626, 627-28 (1999)
(citing research documenting educational harms of peer sexual harassment in school),
important questions remain as to the scope and application of this principle.
One important question is how, if at all, the deliberate indifference
requirement affects the analysis of why the school's response to the
harassment discriminates on the basis of sex.
A. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE AND
DISCRIMINATORY INTENT
At first glance, the meaning of the term "deliberate indifference" is
difficult to discern, as is the role of deliberate indifference as a legal
standard in deciding the significance of an actor's intentions. The word
"indifference" is typically used to signify a lack of any intention,
suggesting that a legal standard premised on deliberate indifference does
not require any particular intent by the actor whose actions are under
review." At the same time, however, the word "deliberate" suggests a
specific state of mind, an intent or conscious desire to do something."
Used together, this odd combination seems like a contradiction in terms: an
intentional absence of intent.
Focusing on the word "deliberate" in isolation has the potential to
create confusion as to the role of intent in the discrimination analysis. If
deliberate indifference were interpreted to denote malice or animus, it
could reassert discriminatory intent into the determination of school
liability for peer sexual harassment under Title IX. Such an interpretation
would be inconsistent with the causation-based approach elaborated above.
However, properly understood, the deliberate indifference requirement is
fully consistent with the above interpretation of Davis, which emphasizes
the school's role in exacerbating the harm of sexual harassment as the basis
for school liability in such cases, regardless of whether or not school
officials intended to discriminate on the basis of sex.
The history behind the Court's adoption of the deliberate indifference
standard under Title IX, coupled with the Court's treatment of deliberate
indifference in other contexts, support a more modest reading of the
requirement-one that does not require any particular intent on the part of
school officials. Under this reading, the deliberate indifference standard
has both a subjective and an objective component. The subjective
component of the standard relates to the actor's actual knowledge of the
sexual harassment. The remaining component of the standard measures the
objective adequacy of the school's response to the harassment.
Motivation-including malice, animus and discriminatory intent-should
not be part of the test for deliberate indifference.
37. The dictionary definition of "indifference" is "lack of interest or concern." RANDOM
HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (2d Ed. 1993).
38. "Deliberate" is defined in the dictionary as "carefully weighed or considered;
intentional." Id.
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1. The Spending Clause Origins of Deliberate Indifference in Title IX and
the Requirement That Recipients Have Sufficient Notice for Damages
Liability
Although the Court has offered little explicit guidance on the meaning
of deliberate indifference under Title IX, the concerns that prompted the
Court's adoption of the standard in this context provide some assistance.
The Court has indicated that it views Title IX as a statute enacted pursuant
to Congress' Article I power under the Spending Clause to place limitations
on the use of federal funds." The origins of Title IX's deliberate
indifference standard lie in the Court's concern about limiting damages
liability under statutes enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause. As the
Court restated in Davis, in order to hold a recipient of federal funds liable
for damages under a Spending Clause statute, the recipient must have
sufficient notice that it may be liable for violating the Act.40 Yet, while the
Court has frequently articulated a notice requirement in claims to recover
damages for violations of Spending Clause statutes, it has not been
completely clear about the type of notice required. The Court has often
conflated two types of notice: (1) notice of what the law requires and (2)
notice of what has occurred within the recipient-institution.
At times, the Court seems to suggest that the notice requirement
signifies the clarity with which Congress must specify the contours of the
proscribed conduct. For example, in Davis, the Court emphasized that
Congress must "speak with a clear voice" when it regulates under the
Spending Clause because "[t]here can.., be no knowing acceptance [of
the terms of the putative contract] if a State is unaware of the conditions
[imposed by the legislation] or is unable to ascertain what is expected of
it."4' In addition, in discussing why the notice requirement for damages
liability was met in Davis, the Court observed that Title IX's regulatory
scheme "has long provided funding recipients with notice that they may be
liable for their failure to respond to the discriminatory acts of certain non-
agents," and that common law too "has put states on notice that they may
be held responsible under state law for their failure to protect students from
the tortious acts of third parties." 42 In statements such as these, the Court's
concern seems to be that recipients understand that their actions violate the
terms of the statute.
However, in the same breath that the Court speaks of notice in terms of
39. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640 (1999); Gebser v. Lago
Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 287 (1998).
40. 526 U.S. at 640. This limitation on damages liability under Spending Clause statutes
corresponds to prior statements by the Court discussing the requirements of Spending
Clause legislation. See id. at 640-42 (citing and discussing Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp.
v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981)); Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 463
U.S. 582 (1983); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992)).
41. 526 U.S. at 640.
42. Id. at 643-44.
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the clarity of the statutory requirements, the Court also discusses notice as
it relates to the recipient's awareness of the challenged conduct before
being held liable for failing to remedy it. For example, the Davis Court
cites approvingly to its prior statement in Gebser that it would be
"'unsound'' to hold recipients liable for damages based on sexual
harassment by a teacher in the absence of officials' knowledge of the
harassment, given that Title IX's express enforcement mechanism requires
notice of an alleged violation and an opportunity to correct it before being
deprived of federal funds.43 This type of notice does not relate to whether a
recipient understands its obligations under the statute, but whether it knows
what is occurring within its own institution. 4
This latter interpretation of the notice requirement-notice of conduct
within the institution as opposed to notice of the specific conduct
proscribed by statute-is the most supportable reading of the concerns
expressed in the Davis opinion. The Court was primarily concerned that
recipients have notice of the alleged harassment and an opportunity to
remedy it before being held liable in damages. This concern comes across
clearly in the Davis Court's reliance on Gebser to explain its adoption of
the deliberate indifference requirement.4 ' Gebser refused to recognize
vicarious liability for a teacher's sexual harassment of a student, based on
the Court's concern that schools would not have an opportunity to address
the secretive actions of teachers before being held liable for damages under
Title IX. The Gebser Court adopted the deliberate indifference standard as
a limitation on school liability despite the absence of any confusion about
whether Title IX proscribed teacher-student sexual harassment-an issue
resolved by the Court years earlier in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools.46
Thus, the deliberate indifference requirement is best seen as the Court's
43. Id. at 641 (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 289). See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2000) (authorizing
agencies that disburse education funds to enforce Title IX through proceedings to suspend
or terminate funds or through "other means authorized by law," and barring the agency from
initiating enforcement proceedings until it has "advised the appropriate person or persons of
the failure to comply with the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be
secured by voluntary means"); 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(d), 100.8(c)-(d) (2000) (requiring
resolution of compliance problems by informal means if possible, and requiring notice to the
recipient and an opportunity to comply voluntarily prior to enforcement proceedings to
terminate federal funds).
44. At some points in the opinion, the Court ambiguously describes the notice
requirement of Spending Clause statutes in a way that could refer to either version of notice
discussed above. See, e.g., Davis, 526 U.S. at 641 (citing Pennhurst's requirement that
recipients have "notice of their potential liability").
45. 526 U.S. at 642.
46. 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992). Because the Court decided Franklin in 1992, before the
sexual harassment in Gebser had occurred, there was no ambiguity about whether the
teacher's conduct constituted discrimination on the basis of sex under Title IX. See Gebser,
524 U.S. at 278 (reciting facts of the case, including the occurrence of sexual intercourse
between the plaintiff and her teacher in January 1993).
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response to its desire to provide recipients of federal funds an opportunity
to correct the discrimination before being held liable in damages. This
concern is satisfied by premising school liability on the school's prior
knowledge of the harassment, followed by an insufficient response by
school officials. The "deliberate" component of the deliberate indifference
standard is met by the recipient's knowledge of the harassment-
knowledge that informs the school's decision of how to respond. It does
not require that the recipient intended to violate Title IX or intentionally
subjected its students to discrimination on the basis of sex.'
Even under the alternative reading of the notice requirement-notice as
awareness of the specific conduct prohibited by the statute-the deliberate
indifference requirement would not necessitate proof that school officials
acted with intent to discriminate or inflict harm on the basis of sex. Rather,
it would be satisfied by notice of the terms of the statute, and the recipient's
decision to act in a way that violates those terms. It would not require
proof of specific intent to violate the statute or the presence of a sex-based
animus or bias.48
Perhaps more important than the Court's view of the notice
requirement embedded in Spending Clause statutes is the Court's failure to
suggest, in discussing the standard for school liability, that the recipient
must intend to violate the statute or intend to discriminate on the basis of
sex. Applying the liability standard to the case at hand, the Court upheld
the complaint against the school district's motion to dismiss, citing several
key facts: the length and severity of the harassment, the effect of the
harassment on the plaintiff, the actual notice of the harassment on the part
of the school board and the school board's failure to make "any effort
whatsoever either to investigate or to put an end to the harassment."'49 The
Court did not discuss or rely on any facts relating to the intentions or
motivations underlying the school's response. The implication of this
parsing of the deliberate indifference discussion in Davis is that the only
state of mind requirement established in the decision relates to the
recipient's actual knowledge of the underlying conduct.
47. Cf. Homer v. Kentucky High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 206 F.3d 685, 692-93 (6th Cir.
2000) (discussing the deliberate indifference standard as the Court's way of enforcing Title
IX's limitation of damages to cases involving intentional discrimination, and stating that
"'intent' in that context means 'actual notice' of the abuse by a third party and a failure to
stop it").
48. Cf. Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 12019, at *62-65 (5th
Cir. June 1, 2000) (rejecting LSU's argument that the Davis standard requires that LSU
"must have been aware that they were discriminating on the basis of sex" in order to be
liable in damages under Title IX, and suggesting that the deliberate indifference standard,
though inapplicable to the athletics context, would actually support holding LSU liable for
causing the discrimination against female athletes).
49. Davis, 526 U.S. at 653-54.
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2. Deliberate Indifference in Other Legal Contexts
This understanding of deliberate indifference is consistent with the
development of the deliberate indifference standard in case law decided
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.50 In Gebser, the Court justified its adoption
of a deliberate indifference standard in Title IX sexual harassment cases by
noting that the same considerations-namely, that institutions not be held
unfairly liable for the independent actions of their employees-motivated
the Court to adopt a deliberate indifference standard for municipal liability
under section 1983. The Gebser Court cited three cases decided under
section 1983 in support of its adoption of a deliberate indifference standard
under Title IX12 Each of these three cases interprets deliberate indifference
to refer to the municipality's knowledge of the risks of harm and the
objective inadequacy of its subsequent response, rather than to a specific
state of mind or an intent to violate the rights of others.
In the first of these, Board of the County Commissioners of Bryan
County v. Brown,53 the Court addressed a section 1983 claim against a
county based on a county police officer's alleged use of excessive force in
arresting the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed that the county hired the
officer without adequately reviewing the officer's background, which
included various criminal offenses, such as assault and battery. The
plaintiff also claimed that the county's decision to hire the officer
established its deliberate indifference to the risk that the officer would use
excessive force. As in Gebser, the Court explained that the deliberate
indifference standard serves as a substitute for respondeat superior liability
in order to ensure that municipal liability is based on the municipality's
own actions rather than the tortious acts of its employees.' The Court
defined deliberate indifference as the county's "conscious disregard for the
known and obvious consequences of its actions."" The Court then rejected
the plaintiff's claim on the ground that the single decision to hire the officer
did not in itself establish the county's deliberate indifference to the "known
or obvious consequences" of a future excessive use of force. 6 Instead, the
Court found, the failure to screen the officer's background established, at
50. The text of 42 U.S.C section 1983 (2000) states, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be




53. 520 U.S. 397 (1997).
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best, a deliberate indifference to the officer's background, noting that "a
full screening of an applicant's background might reveal no cause for
concern at all."'57 Like the Davis Court, the Court in this case grounded the
ultimate standard for institutional liability in the language of causation
rather than motive." The Court summed up the liability standard by
stating, "Congress did not intend to impose liability on a municipality
unless deliberate action attributable to the municipality itself is the 'moving
force' behind the plaintiff's deprivation of federal rights." 9
The other two section 1983 cases cited by the Gebser Court in support
of its deliberate indifference requirement also used deliberate indifference
to denote causation in the sense of the obvious consequences of
disregarding known risk, rather than animus or an intent to harm. In City of
Canton v. Harris,60 the Court held that a municipality may be liable under
section 1983 where the failure to train its employees caused the violation of
a federal right. In order to establish liability under this theory, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the defendant's failure to train amounts to deliberate
indifference to the federal rights of persons who will come into contact
with the untrained employees.6' The Court described the deliberate
indifference standard as denoting the obviousness of the risk presented by
the municipality's failure to provide additional training and the sufficiency
of the existing training program in relation to the duties of the employees.62
57. Id. at 410-11. In addition, the Court found that even if the county had discovered the
officer's complete background, the officer's record of past misdemeanors would not have
made the officer's subsequent use of excessive force "a plainly obvious consequence of the
hiring decision." Id. at 414.
58. As with Title IX, the language of causation is traceable to the statute itself. See id. at
403 ("In light of the statute's imposition of liability on one who 'subjects [a person], or
causes [that person] to be subjected,' to a deprivation of federal rights, we concluded that it
'cannot be easily read to impose liability vicariously on governing bodies solely on the basis
of the existence of an employer-employee relationship with a tortfeasor."'). Although
Justice Souter, in dissent, characterizes section 1983's deliberate indifference requirement as
"tantamount to intent," the intent he refers to is not subjective motive or animus, but an
intentional action, as opposed to an unknowing or accidental response. Id. at 419. Thus,
both majority and dissent use the deliberate indifference standard as a way of ensuring that
the municipality acted culpably in causing harm before it is held liable for the actions of
others. The only subjective state required is the "subjective appreciation" of a substantial
and obvious risk of harm from a failure to act. Id. at 421.
59. Id. at 400. The type of causation required by the Court to establish municipal liability
under section 1983 is more akin to proximate causation, with all its complexity, as opposed
to but-for causation, which the Court explicitly rejects. See id. at 410 (rejecting but-for
causation because "[e]very injury suffered at the hands of a municipal employee can be
traced to a hiring decision in a 'but-for' sense: [b]ut for the municipality's decision to hire
the employee, the plaintiff would not have suffered the injury"); see also id. at 425 (Souter,
J., dissenting) (characterizing the Court's discussion of causation as "simply saying that the
tortious act must be proximately caused by the policymaker").
60. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
61. See id. at 388.
62. See id. at 390; see also id. at 396 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("Where a section 1983 plaintiff can establish that the facts available to city
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Similarly, in Collins v. City of Harker Heights, the Court elaborated on its
decision in Canton, ruling that a municipality's failure to train it officers
"could be characterized as the cause of the constitutional tort if-and only
if-the failure to train amounted to 'deliberate indifference' to the rights"
of its inhabitants.63 In this decision as well, the Court focused on the city's
knowledge of the risks of its failure to provide certain training to its
officers, and the obviousness of the harm that would result from such
failure.
Even in the context of Eighth Amendment claims, where the deliberate
indifference standard has been interpreted most stringently, a requirement
of animus or malice is not the norm.6 The Court has applied a more
stringent test for deliberate indifference in Eighth Amendment claims than
it applies to cases involving a municipality's failure to provide adequate
training for city officials. In a typical case alleging municipal liability for
failure to train police officers, for example, a plaintiff need only show that
the likely harm of not providing the training was obvious,65 whereas in the
Eighth Amendment context, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant
actually knew that the harm was likely.66 In rationalizing the more
objective standard for municipal liability in section 1983 cases than for
determining Eighth Amendment violations, the Court has recognized the
difficulty, if not impossibility, of discerning the subjective mental state of a
municipal entity. 67 This same concern would apply equally to school
districts, supporting the more objective test for deliberate indifference in
the Title IX context.
However, even the more stringent Eighth Amendment test for
deliberate indifference generally does not require proof of intent to cause
harm. The Court first adopted the deliberate indifference standard in an
Eighth Amendment case in Estelle v. Gamble, holding that the provision of
inadequate medical care in prison may violate the Eighth Amendment.68 As
stated in Estelle, deliberate indifference requires "something more than
policymakers put them on actual or constructive notice that the particular omission is
substantially certain to result in the violation of the constitutional rights of their citizens, the
dictates of Monell are satisfied. Only then can it be said that the municipality has made 'a
deliberate choice to follow a course of action ... from among various alternatives."').
63. 503 U.S. 115, 123-24 (1992).
64. A great deal of section 1983 litigation involves Eighth Amendment challenges to
prison conditions. See generally SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
LITIGATION, THE LAW OF SECTION 1983, VOL. 1 § 3:27 (4th ed. 1999). In such cases, the
deliberate indifference requirement applies to the threshold determination of the
constitutional violation, and is not merely, as in the context of municipal liability, a
substitute for respondeat superior liability when municipalities are sued for the tortious
conduct of their employees. See Collins, 503 U.S. at 124.
65. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
66. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 841 (1994).
67. See id.
68. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
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mere negligence, [but] ... something less than acts or omissions for the
very purpose of causing harm."'  The Court permitted the plaintiff to
establish deliberate indifference by showing that the defendant
"'consciously disregard[ed]' a substantial risk of serious harm."70  The
subjective part of the deliberate indifference test in an Eighth Amendment
challenge is limited to the defendant's awareness that its actions create a
high risk of resulting harm; it does not require proof of animus or malice.
Judge Posner explained the standard as follows:
[T]o be guilty of "deliberate indifference" [prison officials] must
know they are creating a substantial risk of bodily harm. If they
place a prisoner in a cell that has a cobra, but they do not know that
there is a cobra there (or even that there is a high probability that
there is a cobra there), they are not guilty of deliberate indifference
even if they should have known about the risk, that is, even if they
were negligent-even grossly negligent or even reckless in the tort
sense-in failing to know. But if they know that there is a cobra
there or at least that there is a high probability of a cobra there, and
do nothing, that is deliberate indifference.
7'
Only in a limited category of Eighth Amendment cases, such as prison
security cases involving excessive use of force, have courts taken a more
stringent approach to the deliberate indifference test, requiring plaintiffs to
demonstrate that the defendant acted with a subjective intent to harm. In
such cases, the rationale for the higher standard is that prison officials
require more leeway when responding under the pressure of immediate
threats to prison security without the luxury of hindsight or a second
chance.' In this limited context, the test for deliberate indifference asks
"whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline or 'maliciously and sadistically' in order to cause harm."74 A
malicious motive standard for deliberate indifference has not been
expanded to other Eighth Amendment or section 1983 contexts and has
been rejected in all but those most extreme situations that require the
utmost deference to state officials. It should not influence the meaning of
deliberate indifference in Title IX sexual harassment cases. The risks
69. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)).
70. Id. at 839. The requisite knowledge is not that the official knew that the harm would
actually occur, only that the harm was likely to occur. This knowledge may be inferred
from circumstantial evidence.
71. Billman v. Indiana Dep't of Corrections, 56 F.3d 785,788 (7th Cir. 1995).
72. See SHELDON H. NAHMOD ETAL., CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIvIL LiBERTIEs LITIGATION, THE
LAW OF SECrION 1983 118-19 (3d ed. Cumulative Supp. 1996).
73. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (stating that, in such cases, plaintiffs
must show that the prison officials acted "maliciously and sadistically" to bring about the
violation in the prisoner's civil rights).
74. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,320-21 (1986); see Howard v. Barnett, 21 F.3d 868,
872 (8th Cir. 1994).
involved to institutional security in second-guessing school officials'
responses to student-to-student harassment are significantly different in
kind and degree than the considerations that underlie the Court's more
stringent requirement in prison security cases.
3. Deliberate Indifference in Title IX Claims in the Lower Courts
Although it is too soon to tell what meaning courts will attribute to
deliberate indifference in the Title IX context, to date, post-Gebser/Davis
cases have applied a deliberate indifference test consistent with a
causation-based standard, and have not used the standard as an opening to
inquire into the subjective intent of school officials. Early judicial
discussions of how deliberate indifference would apply to sexual
harassment claims under Title IX reflect a similar reading of this standard.
In a pre-Gebser opinion, for example, Judge Posner first endorsed a
deliberate indifference test in a Title IX case involving peer sexual
harassment in school as a way of protecting schools from what he viewed
as excessive liability under a negligence-based standard.75 As articulated
by Judge Posner, the deliberate indifference standard would require a
school to possess actual notice of the harassment, but not discriminatory
intent. As Posner explained:
Three types of intentional failure [to act] can be distinguished. The
first, which must be very rare, is where the school wants the
harassment to occur. The second is where the school deliberately
treats harassment differently depending on the sex, race, etc. of the
pupils involved. There too, liability is clear. The third and most
difficult case is where the school knows about the harassment,
knows that it is serious or even dangerous, and could take effective
measures at low cost to avert the danger, but decides-consciously,
deliberately-to do nothing, although it does not base this decision
on an invidious grounds such as race or sex. The school doesn't
mean any harm to the victim of the harassment, but knowing that
the harassment is occurring, is serious, etc., it decides to do
nothing .... This difficult third case is the domain of "deliberate
indifference," which is the equivalent of criminal recklessness. 6
Posner defined deliberate indifference to encompass a situation where
the school had actual notice of harassment that was likely to interfere with
the victim's education, yet, without justification, "deliberately did nothing,
75. See Doe v. University of Ill., 138 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 1998), vacating and remanding,
526 U.S. 1142 (1999), on remand, 200 F.3d 499 (7th Cir. 1999) (remanding the case to the
district court for reconsideration of the plaintiffs claim under the "'deliberate indifference'
liability standard established by the Supreme Court in Davis").
76. Id. at 680 (emphasis added).
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or took steps that it knew would be ineffectual, to protect the victim."77 As
proposed by Judge Posner, deliberate indifference did not refer to an intent
to harm or even a discriminatory motive, but a standard of fault somewhat
higher than negligence, that is established by a school's actual knowledge
of likely harm and its objectively unreasonable decision not to remedy it.
Since the Supreme Court's adoption of the deliberate indifference
standard in Gebser, which the Court applied to peer sexual harassment one
year later in Davis, lower courts have interpreted deliberate indifference to
denote the objective inadequacy of the school's response to the harassment,
rather than a discriminatory bias or motive on the part of school officials.
7
Courts that have accepted plaintiffs' showing of deliberate indifference
have done so based on proof that the school responded inadequately despite
actual notice of the harassment, without regard to the presence or absence
of discriminatory bias or intent.79 For example, in one case involving
teacher-student sexual harassment, allegations that the board of education
responded to reports of a male teacher's inappropriate sexual contact with
male students by merely reprimanding the teacher and transferring him to a
different school, rather than removing the teacher from the school
environment, sufficed to defeat the school board's motion for summary
judgment on the issue of deliberate indifference.' ° The court's ruling
focused on the school board's response to allegations of the teacher's
sexual contacts with students in light of its awareness of reports about the
teacher's past inappropriate sexual conduct with other students.8 The court
did not inquire into the motivation underlying the school board's tepid
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Flores v. Saulpaugh, 115 F. Supp. 2d 319, 323 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating
that deliberate indifference does not mean "that the defendant's action or inaction was taken
'maliciously or sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm,"' but rather that "the
[defendant's] response to the harassment[,] or lack thereof[,] is clearly unreasonable in light
of the known circumstances.") (citations omitted); Haines v. Metropolitan Gov't of
Davidson County, 32 F. Supp. 2d 991, 996, 1000 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) (plaintiff's allegation
that school district imposed only minimal disciplinary action in response to severe, known
student-on-student sexual harassment sufficed to show deliberate indifference); Chontos v.
Rhea, 29 F. Supp. 2d 931, 934 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (describing the deliberate indifference
standard adopted in Gebser as referring to "an official's 'consciously disregard[ing] an
obvious risk that [another] would subsequently inflict a particular' injury") (citation
omitted).
79. See, e.g., Doe v. School Admin. Dist. No. 19, 66 F. Supp. 2d 57, 64 (D. Me. 1999)
(finding sufficient evidence to show deliberate indifference where school officials failed to
conduct a thorough investigation of allegations of a teacher-student sexual relationship);
Massey v. Akron Bd. of Educ., 82 F. Supp. 2d 735, 738-45 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (evidence that
school officials took minimal corrective action in response to allegations of teacher-student
sexual abuse was sufficient to avoid summary judgment on issue of deliberate indifference);
Murrell v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 186 F.3d 1238, 1247 (10th Cir. 1999)
(evidence that school officials failed to investigate or take disciplinary action in response to
alleged rape of a female student by a male student established deliberate indifference).
80. See Massey, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 738-42,744-45.
81. See id.
response.
Even in post-Gebser harassment cases where courts have used the
language of discriminatory intent, they have not actually engaged in a
search for intent or motive. For example, in Gant v. Wallingford Board of
Education,82 a race discrimination claim alleging peer racial harassment
under 42 U.S.C. sections 1981 and 1983, the court borrowed Title IX's
deliberate indifference standard and engaged in a confusing discussion that
conflated discriminatory intent with an unreasonable response to
harassment. After describing the Supreme Court's adoption of the
deliberate indifference standard in Gebser, the court concluded, "[t]he
ultimate inquiry, of course, is one of discriminatory purpose on the part of
the defendant himself."83 Yet, the court followed this statement with a
sentence that refuted the suggestion that the critical issue is one of
discriminatory intent:
It is not necessary to prove that the defendant fully appreciated the
harmful consequence of the discrimination, because deliberate
indifference is not the same as action (or inaction) taken
"maliciously or sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm."
Instead, deliberate indifference can be found when the defendant's
response to known discrimination is clearly unreasonable in light
of the known circumstances.4
Most importantly, in deciding that the plaintiff failed to establish
deliberate indifference, the court examined the reasonableness of the
school's response rather than the motivations of school officials.85 Other
courts that have slipped into the language of discriminatory intent also have
applied the deliberate indifference standard objectively to gauge the
adequacy of the school's response to known harassment.86
As this brief survey of the post-Gebser/Davis case law suggests, so far,
at least, lower courts have applied Title IX's deliberate indifference test in
sexual harassment cases consistent with a causation-based approach to
discrimination, rather than insisting upon proof of discriminatory intent.
82. 195 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 1999).
83. Id. at 141.
84. Id. (citation omitted).
85. See id. at 142-45.
86. See, e.g., Carroll K. v. Fayette County, 19 F. Supp. 2d 618, 621-22 (S.D. W. Va.
1998) (responding to the defendant's request to dismiss the complaint for failure "to allege
facts showing the [school district] had a discriminatory intent" by pointing out that plaintiffs
had alleged facts suggesting that the district knew of the harassment and decided not to
intervene, and denying the motion to dismiss); Morlock v. West Cent. Educ. Dist., 46 F.
Supp. 2d 892, 908-10 (D. Minn. 1999) (discussing the concern that Title IX not be applied
to grade school teasing, lest schools be "charged with discriminatory intent for permitting it
to occur without substantial intervention," but upholding the Title IX peer harassment claim
based on proof that the school's response was clearly unreasonable, without requiring proof
of a discriminatory motive).
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4. The Limitations of Deliberate Indifference as a Standard for School
Liability
To say that the deliberate indifference standard properly avoids an
inquiry into discriminatory intent is not to say that the standard is a
plaintiff-friendly test or even, necessarily, the right legal standard. A great
deal of commentary after Davis has criticized the Court's ruling as setting
too high a bar for plaintiffs seeking to hold schools accountable for their
role in facilitating sexual harassment.8 Much of this criticism is justified.
The adoption of the deliberate indifference standard in Davis marks an
unwarranted upward departure from the standard of liability in workplace
harassment law, which holds the employer liable for sexual harassment by
coworkers if it knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to
take prompt and appropriate corrective action.88 In contrast, Title IX holds
schools liable for damages only for deliberate indifference in responding to
harassment where responsible school officials had actual notice of the
harassment." It is difficult to understand why, as a matter of policy,
discrimination law should set a higher threshold for liability for sexual
harassment in schools in comparison with the workplace.9° Indeed,
87. See, e.g., Joan Schaffner, Recent Development: Approaching the New Millennium
with Mixed Blessings for Harassed Gay Students, 22 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 159, 181 (1999)
("A deliberate indifference standard is a strict standard for plaintiffs to meet."); Karen
Michaelis, Title JX and Same-Gender Sexual Harassment: School District Liability for
Damages, 2000 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 47, 89 ("[T]he new [Davis] standard makes it even
easier for courts to protect the resources of school districts at the expense of student victims
of sexual harassment."); Ivan Bodensteiner, Peer Harassment-Interference with an Equal
Educational Opportunity in Elementary and Secondary Schools, 79 NEB. L. REv. 1, 42
(2000) (criticizing Davis decision on the ground that, "[a]s in Gebser, there is more concern
for the schools and their financial condition than for the victims of harassment"); Leading
Cases, supra note 26, at 374-75 (criticizing the Court's requirement of actual notice and
rejection of a constructive notice standard); Heather D. Redmond, Davis v. Monroe County
Board of Education: Scant Protection for the Student Body, 18 LAw & INEQ. 393, 412
(2000) (same); Kelly Dixon Furr, How Well Are the Nation's Children Protected from Peer
Harassment at School? Title IX Liability in the Wake of Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1573, 1600 (2000) (same).
88. See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-905 (11th Cir. 1982)
(adopting liability standard holding employers liable when they knew or should have known
of the harassment and failed to take "prompt remedial action"); De Grace v. Rumsfeld, 614
F.2d 796, 803 (1st Cir. 1980) (same); Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094, 1103-1104
(2d Cir. 1986) (same); Swentek v. USAir, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987) (same);
Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014-15 (8th Cir. 1988) (same); Ellison v. Brady,
924 F.2d 872, 881 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); see also EEOC Guidelines on Sexual Harassment,
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (2000) (interpreting Title VII to hold employers liable for failure to
take prompt and appropriate corrective action once they knew or should have known of
sexual harassment by coworkers).
89. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
90. See Verna L. Williams & Deborah L. Brake, When a Kiss Isn't Just a Kiss: Title IX
and Student-to-Student Harassment, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 423, 451-52 (1997) (urging
courts to apply Title VII-type standards to peer sexual harassment claims under Title IX so
that students will have as much protection from sexual harassment in school as employees
have in the workplace).
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important considerations point in the opposite direction, since students are
less likely to be able to discern the proper channels for communicating
notice and to comprehend and report sexual harassment when they
experience it.9' At the same time, the different liability standards provide
more of an incentive to employers than to schools to discover and eliminate
sexual harassment within their institutions, despite the arguably greater
vulnerability of children and young adults to sexual misconduct and
harassment.92
Moreover, there is a danger that lower courts will apply the actual
notice and deliberate indifference standards strictly to further limit the
ability of students to recover for the harms that result from a school's
failure to respond to sexual harassment. The level of protection from
sexual harassment that Title IX affords students depends to a large extent
on how lower courts interpret and apply the actual notice requirement. By
manipulating the type of facts necessary to establish actual notice and the
persons who may receive notice, lower courts can greatly influence the
level of protection available to students under Title IX.' For example, in
the teacher-student harassment context, some courts have required that
actual notice be given to the school superintendent or members of the
school board, rather than to the principal or other persons who exercise
control over the harasser.94 A similar ambiguity exists with respect to peer
91. See Kelly Titus, Students, Beware: Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District,
60 LA. L. REv. 321, 344 (1999) (explaining that younger students have a greater tendency to
view more people as authority figures); see, e.g., Joan Schaffner, supra note 87, at 200-201
(discussing policy arguments for providing students with greater protection from sexual
harassment in school than employees receive in the workplace); Redmond, supra note 87, at
414-15 (noting that "[m]any students and parents will not always report the incident to the
most powerful official at the school," and that "a child may not have the ability to identify
the conduct as harassment.").
92. See, e.g., Leading Cases, supra note 26, at 375-78 (discussing the disincentive for
schools to discover and investigate possible sexual harassment under the Davis standard);
Furr, supra note 87, at 1600 (arguing that the Davis standard encourages schools to close
lines of communication with teachers so that administrators can argue that school authorities
did not have actual notice of the harassment); Titus, supra note 91, at 334 (discussing the
incentives that the actual notice standard places on schools to "insulate themselves from
knowledge" and keep any grievance procedures under cover); see also Furr, supra note 87,
at 1595 ("Children are more easily intimidated by the harassing behavior .... may fear
isolation from their peers in retaliation .... may blame themselves for the harassment.");
Titus, supra note 91, at 338 ("Students are transient and less likely to seek remedial
action .... ).
93. Compare Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 848-49, 855 (6th Cir. 1999) (notice of prior
kissing incident involving male student and a mentally impaired female student did not put
school on notice so as to hold school liable for its failure to take precautionary measures to
avoid subsequent rape involving same two students), with id. at 857 (Moore, J., dissenting)
(arguing that notice of prior incident should have put school on notice of danger of sexual
assault and prompted more careful supervision), and Doe v. School Admin. Dist. No. 19, 66
F. Supp. 2d 57, 64 (D. Me. 1999) (notice of rumors of teacher's sexual relationship with
student was sufficient to establish actual notice and trigger school's duty to investigate).
94. See, e.g., Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 791 (l1th Cir. 1998), affd on
[Vol. 12:1
Winter 2001] SHIFTING FROM INTENT TO CAUSATION 27
sexual harassment. It is not yet clear whether giving a teacher notice of
student-on-student sexual harassment satisfies the Davis standard, even if
the teacher clearly had authority to discipline the harassing student.95
Issues surrounding what facts suffice to establish actual notice also
influence the scope of Title IX in this area.96 For example, courts are
divided over whether notice of the harasser's sexual misconduct with
respect to other students may establish actual notice of the danger posed to
students generally. ' How broadly or narrowly courts interpret the actual
notice standard will greatly affect Title IX's effectiveness in providing
meaningful redress for sexual harassment of students.
Likewise, the deliberate indifference standard is susceptible to varying
interpretations that will affect the ability of students to find meaningful
protection from sexual harassment under Title IX. There is a danger that
reconsideration, 171 F.3d 1264 (1999) (requiring school superintendent to have notice of
the harassment in teacher-student harassment case in order to support a damages claim
against the school); see also Joan E. Schaffner, Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education: The Unresolved Questions, 21 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 79, 88-90 (2000)
(criticizing Floyd's overly restrictive application of Title IX's actual notice standard).
95. Compare Morlock v. West Cent. Educ. Dist., 46 F. Supp. 2d 892, 908-909 (D. Minn.
1999) (suggesting that a teacher's actual notice of student-to-student harassment counts as
notice to the school), and Murrell v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 186 F.3d 1238, 1248
(10th Cir. 1999) (assuming that a teacher's actual notice of student-to-student harassment
places the school on notice of the harassment), with id. at 1252 (Anderson, J., concurring)
(questioning whether notice to a teacher can establish actual notice on the part of the
school); and Adusumilli v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., No. 97-C8507, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14413, at *8-9 (N.D. IM. Sept. 8, 1998) (treating notice to professor of harassment by
students as insufficient to establish notice on the part of the school), affd on other grounds,
No. 98-3561, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 17954 (7th Cir. July 20, 1999). See also Redmond,
supra note 87, at 414 (noting that the Davis standard leaves open the question of who must
have actual knowledge of the harassment).
96. Cf. Crandell v. New York College of Osteophathic Med., 87 F. Supp. 2d 304, 320
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("Clearly, the institution must have actual knowledge of at least some
incidents of harassment in order for liability to attach .... It is equally evident, however,
that actual knowledge of every incident could not possibly be required, as this would burden
the plaintiff unfairly in cases of frequent harassment .... Suffice it to say ... that the
institution at a minimum must have possessed enough knowledge of the harassment that it
reasonably could have responded with remedial measures to address the kind of harassment
upon which plaintiff's legal claim is based.") (citation omitted).
97. Compare Doe v. Gooden, 214 F.3d 952, 956 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding that notice of a
harasser's sexual harassment and abuse of persons other than the plaintiff does not establish
notice of the harasser's propensity to harass the plaintiff), and Sherman ex rel. v. Helms, 80
F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1371 (M.D. Ga. 2000) (same), with Doe v. School Admin. Dist. No. 19,
66 F. Supp. 2d 57, 63 (D. Me. 1999) (suggesting that actual notice that the harasser targeted
other persons for harassment may demonstrate actual notice of the danger that the harasser
posed to the plaintiff), Gordon ex rel. v. Ottumwa Sch. Dist., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1082
(S.D. Iowa 2000) (same), Warren v. Reading Sch. Dist., 82 F. Supp. 2d 395 (E.D. Pa. 2000)
(same), Massey v. Akron City Bd. of Educ., 82 F. Supp. 2d 735, 745 (N.D. Ohio 2000)
(same), Chontos v. Rhea, 29 F. Supp. 2d 931, 935-37 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (same), and Ericson
v. Syracuse Univ., 35 F. Supp. 2d 326, 328-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (same). See also Harris v.
City of Pagedale, 821 F.2d 499, 505-506 (8th Cir. 1987) (in section 1983 claim, finding
notice of prior assaults against other victims sufficient to establish city's deliberate
indifference with respect to plaintiff's constitutional rights).
courts will apply the deliberate indifference test so strictly as to exclude
from liability all but those most egregious cases where schools take no
action whatsoever in the face of the most severe forms of harassment.9 To
date, however, that danger has not materialized. Certainly, in those cases
where schools officials have failed to take any action in response to
student-on-student harassment, courts have easily found the deliberate
indifference standard satisfied.99 But courts have not limited Title IX
damages liability to only those cases involving a complete failure to
respond to known sexual harassment. In a number of recent decisions,
courts have upheld Title IX claims where schools have taken some
remedial steps in response to sexual harassment by students, but the action
was clearly inadequate and ineffective.' t° Courts have likewise found
deliberate indifference to be satisfied in teacher-student harassment cases
where the school imposed some disciplinary action, albeit inadequate.'' I
98. See, e.g., Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 171 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 1999)
(stating that deliberate indifference may not be shown where the school district "did not
'turn a blind eye and do nothing') (quoting Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463,
467 (8th Cir. 1996)).
99. See, e.g., Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1243-44, 1247-48 (school's failure to take any
corrective action in response to known rape of mentally disabled student by another student,
and its efforts to conceal the attack, established deliberate indifference); Ray v. Antioch
Unified Sch. Dist., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1169-72 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (school's complete
failure to respond to notice of student-on-student harassment constituted deliberate
indifference); Carroll v. Fayette County Bd. of Educ., 19 F. Supp. 2d 618, 622 (S.D. W. Va.
1998) (allegation that teacher stood by and said, "[h]ere we go again," while student
physically assaulted another student sufficed to allege deliberate indifference); Morse v.
Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 154 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir. 1998) (allegation that plaintiff
reported "acts of sexual harassment and gender bias ... to [University representatives]
without any remedial action taken by the University in response to the complaints"
sufficiently alleged deliberate indifference).
100. See Montgomery v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1086,
1095 (D. Minn. 2000) (inconsistent and ineffective disciplinary measures in response to
severe and long-term student-to-student harassment could establish deliberate indifference);
Morlock, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 909-10 (finding that the school's imposition of disciplinary
measures for some incidents of student-on-student harassment did not prevent the court
from finding deliberate indifference based on the school's failure to respond to other
incidents of such harassment); Haines v. Metropolitan Gov't of Davidson County, 32 F.
Supp. 2d 991, 995-96, 999-1000 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) (finding the allegation that the school
imposed an in-school suspension of only one day on the boys who sexually harassed the
plaintiff sufficient to establish deliberate indifference).
101. See Massey, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 738-42, 746-47 (finding mere warnings and reprimand
of teacher who engaged in inappropriate sexual conduct with students constituted deliberate
indifference where school officials failed to remove teacher from school environment);
Baynard v. Lawson, 112 F. Supp. 2d 524, 529-30 (E.D. Va. 2000) (mere counseling of
teacher in response to lap-sitting incident could establish deliberate indifference); Canty v.
Old Rochester Reg'l Sch. Dist., 66 F. Supp. 2d 114, 116-17 (D. Mass. 1999) (school's
responsive action consisting of three letters of reprimand and order restricting contact was
plainly inadequate under the circumstances and could establish deliberate indifference);
Flores v. Saulpaugh, 115 F. Supp. 2d 319, 323-24 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (school's removal of
harasser from Dean of Students position after formal complaint was filed did not keep
plaintiff from proving deliberate indifference); Chontos, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 936-37
(university's written reprimand and requirement that the harasser obtain counseling did not
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do not mean to suggest that deliberate indifference as applied in Title IX
cases is a lenient standard-or even, for that matter, a sufficiently
protective standard. In some cases, courts have found deliberate
indifference lacking despite evidence that the school's responsive action
was flawed and insufficient to stop the harassment."2 Nevertheless, the
Davis standard permits plaintiffs to recover for clearly unreasonable
responses to sexual harassment on the part of the school without having to
demonstrate that a discriminatory animus or bias motivated the school's
response. In this respect, the Davis standard marks a step forward for
discrimination law.
II. DAVIS IN CONTEXT: A MODEST BUT SIGNIFICANT
DEPARTURE FROM DISCRIMINATORY INTENT AS THE
TOUCHSTONE OF DISCRIMINATION
As noted above, the Davis standard has been justly criticized for setting
too high a threshold for school liability, particularly when compared to the
more easily satisfied standard for employer liability in sexual harassment
cases. Yet, it is important to recognize the significant development in the
meaning of discrimination that Davis represents. Despite its flaws, the
Davis test for school liability moves beyond an intent standard that purports
to evaluate the subjective motivations underlying an institution's response
to sexual harassment.
In this respect, Davis stands in some tension with the line drawn in
discrimination law between intentional discrimination and disparate
impact-a line often rigidly enforced by requiring strict proof of a
discriminatory motivation underlying the challenged action. For example,
in Personnel Adminstrator of Massachussetts v. Feeney, the Court rejected
an equal protection challenge to a state veterans' preference law that had a
"severe" foreseeable impact on women's civil service job opportunities
because the plaintiff failed to prove that the legislature enacted the statute
preclude finding of deliberate indifference).
102 See Wilson v. Webb, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 23585, at *5-12, *18 (6th Cir. Sept. 13,
2000) (ruling that deliberate indifference was not established where the school investigated
rumors of teacher-student relationship, even though the investigation was flawed); Doe v.
Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 220 F.3d 380, 388-89 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that deliberate
indifference was not satisfied where the school investigated allegations of harassment,
although the investigator's finding that harassment did not occur turned out to be false);
Wills v. Brown Univ., 184 F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding that the university's
"reasonably firm" reprimand of the harasser was sufficient to avoid liability under Title Ix's
deliberate indifference standard, even though it did not stop the harasser from subsequently
harassing other students). But see id. at 41-42 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (contending that the
university's failure to respond sufficiently to the same harasser's subsequent harassment of
other students should be considered in establishing deliberate indifference with respect to
the university's response to harassment of plaintiff). See also Canty, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 116
n.3 (noting that the Fifth and Eighth Circuits seem to be applying a more stringent standard
of deliberate indifference in Title IX cases than the First Circuit).
"'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects" upon women. '
In the absence of proof that the statute was enacted with the "collateral goal
of keeping women in a stereotypic and predefined place," the Court upheld
the statute even though its negative impact on women's job opportunities
was a known and unavoidable consequence of the state's law, and even
though this impact was traceable to discrimination that had limited
women's opportunities for military service. As in the Feeney case, the
discriminatory intent requirement has often worked to protect institutional
structures and practices that disadvantage women for want of proof that the
decision was motivated by a sex-based animus. 5
The Davis standard, on the other hand, permits courts to hold schools
accountable in damages-damages which are available under Title IX only
for intentional discrimination'°6-for their non-responsiveness in the face of
known sexual harassment, wholly apart from the school's motivation for its
actions. Thus, courts after Davis have easily found that where responsible
school officials have actual notice of sexual harassment and take no action,
schools are liable under Title IX 07 Courts would not necessarily reach this
conclusion if they had to inquire into whether school officials actually
intended to discriminate on the basis of sex.
Yet, looking at the larger body of discrimination law, Davis does not
represent a dramatic change in direction or an anomalous departure from a
clear intent standard. For several decades, courts have been inconsistent in
the weight accorded to an actor's motivation in a discrimination analysis.
In some contexts, as in Davis, the Court has not required proof of
103. 442 U.S. 256, 260, 279 (1979); see also Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,
506 U.S. 263 (1993) (requiring proof of animus against women to succeed on claim under
42 U.S.C. section 1985(3) for conspiring to deprive women of equal protection of the laws);
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (rejecting equal protection challenge to the
application of the death penalty to a black male in Georgia for failure to prove that a racially
discriminatory intent motivated the death sentence).
104. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 278,279.
105. See, e.g., Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779, 780, 783 (3d Cir.
1990) (finding that dismissal of pregnant student from National Honor Society on the
grounds that she had premarital sex was not necessarily intentional discrimination, even
though no males had ever been dismissed from the society for engaging in premarital sex,
where plaintiff failed to prove that school officials were motivated by bias against women);
Ricketts v. City of Columbia, 36 F.3d 775, 781 (8th Cir. 1994) (concluding that plaintiff's
proof that the city made fewer arrests in domestic violence cases did not raise an inference
of discriminatory intent against women, even though over ninety percent of the victims of
domestic violence were female); Soto v. Carrasquillo, 878 F. Supp. 324, 330 (D.P.R. 1995)
(evidence of discriminatory policy towards domestic violence victims did not, as a matter of
law, establish the existence of a discriminatory animus against women), affd sub nora., Soto
v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056 (1st Cir. 1997); Homer v. Kentucky High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 206
F.3d 685, 696-97 (6th Cir. 2000) (ruling that plaintiff failed to show that athletic
association's policy of not sanctioning girls' fast-pitch softball was motivated by
discriminatory animus).
106. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992).
107. See cases cited supra note 79.
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discriminatory intent or motive to establish what it has nonetheless termed
intentional discrimination. One prominent example is the courts' treatment
of sexual harassment cases under Title VIL Since the enactment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, it has been necessary to categorize Title VII
claims in which plaintiffs seek damages as involving either intentional
discrimination or disparate impact, since jury trials and damages are
available under Title VII only for claims of intentional discrimination.' 8 In
sorting such claims, courts have quietly but consistently treated sexual
harassment, including coworker and third party harassment, as a species of
intentional discrimination by the employer.'O° Without much in the way of
analysis or explanation, courts have assumed that an employer's failure to
adequately respond to sexual harassment of which it had actual or
constructive notice constitutes intentional discrimination per se.I10
108. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000) (adding a damages remedy under Title VII for
intentional discrimination). Prior to the Act, when no damages remedy was available for
any type of discrimination under Title VII, such categorization was not necessary because
Title VII reaches both disparate impact and intentional discrimination. See generally Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
109. See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 264 (1994) (assuming, in
deciding retroactivity of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, that hostile environment claim for
coworker harassment established intentional discrimination); Pollard v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours Co., 213 F.3d 933, 943 (6th Cir. 2000) (upholding compensatory damages award
where plaintiff was subjected to hostile environment sexual harassment by coworkers and
supervisors knew of the harassment but failed to adequately respond, and describing the
claim as disparate treatment), cert. granted, No. 00-763, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 45 (Jan. 8,
2001); Deters v. Equifax Credit Info. Serv., Inc., 202 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2000) (upholding
compensatory damages award to a woman who was sexually harassed by three male co-
workers and a male supervisor); Howard v. Bums Bros., 149 F.3d 835, 843 (8th Cir. 1998)
(upholding compensatory damages award in hostile environment claim for coworker
harassment); Canada v. Boyd Group, 809 F. Supp. 771, 779-80 (D. Nev. 1992) (treating
hostile environment harassment as intentional discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of
1991); Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024, 1029-30 (D. Nev. 1992)
(holding employer liable for intentional discrimination under Title VII for knowingly
tolerating sexual harassment by customers); Blatnicky v. Village of Shorewood, No. 94-
C3213, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11814, at *15 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 1995) (assuming damages
claim for hostile environment sexual harassment alleged intentional discrimination in
discussing whether Title VII preempted section 1983 action for same conduct).
110. Statements to this effect first surfaced in sexual harassment cases decided well before
the 1991 Act, describing sexual harassment as a species of intentional discrimination or
disparate treatment, as opposed to disparate impact. See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee,
682 F.2d 897, 903, 905 (1lth Cir. 1982) (treating hostile environment harassment as a form
of intentional discrimination under Title VII, whether perpetrated by supervisors, coworkers
or third parties); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990)
(assuming, in sexual harassment claim brought under Title VII for employer's failure to
remedy coworker harassment, that employer intended to discriminate); Bohen v. City of
Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1187, 1190 (7th Cir. 1986) (same); Bator v. Hawaii, 39 F.3d 1021,
1029 (9th Cir. 1994) (same); see also Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Prod. Corp., 772 F.2d 1250,
1258 (6th Cir. 1985) ("An employer intends discrimination where he condones racial
harassment of employees."); Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1421 (7th Cir.
1986) (assuming that employer's tolerance of racial harassment by coworkers established
intentional discrimination by employer in claim brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1981,
which requires proof of intentional discrimination).
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Certainly, this result could be explained by the rationale discussed above in
connection with Davis that the employer's response causes the
discrimination by exacerbating the harm of the underlying harassment."'
Indeed, a similar relationship between harassers' actions and employers'
tolerance of sexual harassment has been documented in the workplace. -
Yet, courts have not explicitly embraced this or any other explanation for
why employer inaction in the face of coworker harassment constitutes
intentional discrimination by the employer; they have simply asserted it. "1
3
Similarly, in certain other contexts besides sexual harassment, courts
have applied a nominal intent requirement that focuses on whether
institutions governed by discrimination laws cause or perpetuate
discriminatory harm. Professor Daniel Ortiz has pointed out that in areas
of law characterized by greater government regulation and less free market
control, such as education, voting rights and jury selection, courts have
abandoned any actual search for discriminatory intent while retaining in
nominal form a discriminatory intent standard."' Ortiz argues that instead
of applying an intent standard in such cases, courts more carefully
scrutinize government practices that perpetuate inequality, applying
something closer to an effects standard. " 5 As indicated from the above
111. One court's discussion of employer liability in a case decided before the enactment of
the 1991 Civil Rights Act suggested the appropriateness of such a rationale. See Hansel v.
Public Serv. Co. of Colo, 778 F. Supp. 1126, 1132, 1133 (D. Colo. 1991) (noting that
"'[e]mployers send the wrong message to potential harassers when they do not discipline
employees for sexual harassment') (quoting Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 882 (9th Cir.
1991)). However, the court nevertheless described the employer's misconduct as a form of
"employer negligence," as opposed to intentional discrimination. Id. at 1132 (quoting
Hirschfield v. New Mexico Corrections Dep't, 916 F.2d 572, 577 (10th Cir. 1990)).
112. See John B. Pryor & Nora J. Whalen, A Typology of Sexual Harassment;
Characteristics of Harassers and the Social Circumstances Under Which Sexual
Harassment Occurs, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT; THEORY, RESEARCH, AND TREATMENT 133-
34 (William O'Donohue ed., 1997) (describing research demonstrating that whether local
social norms condoned or permitted sexual harassment is an important factor in whether
individuals sexually harass).
113. The question of why sexual harassment is a form of intentional discrimination by
employers is more easily explained in cases involving harassment by a supervisor, where
vicarious liability attaches to the employer. The harasser in a sexual harassment case is
presumed to engage in intentional discrimination against the target. See, e.g., Burlington
Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 756 (1998) ("Sexual harassment under Title VII presupposes
intentional conduct."). Thus, in supervisor harassment cases, the harasser's discriminatory
intent is attributed to the employer under agency principles. See id. at 764-65 (adopting
standard of vicarious liability for supervisor harassment, with an affirmative defense in
cases not involving any tangible adverse employment action). This is not the case in co-
worker harassment cases, where the employer's liability is based on its own responsive
action rather than an agency relationship with the harasser.
114. See Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105
(1989).
115. See id. at 1119-34. Affirmative action could be seen as another context in which the
Court does not require proof of intent to establish "intentional discrimination." See Michael
Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO.
L.J. 279, 288-89 (1997) (using the example of affirmative action to argue that the Court
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discussion of courts' treatment of sexual harassment at work, Ortiz's theory
does not completely explain the rationale for the absence of a serious intent
requirement in some contexts, since employment falls on the market side of
his schemata. Nevertheless, Ortiz's analysis demonstrates the existence of
several contexts, in addition to those involving sexual harassment, in which
intent is not strictly required for proof of what is termed intentional
discrimination.
Davis provides yet another opportunity to rethink the use of
discriminatory intent as a dividing line in discrimination law and the use of
a discriminatory motive analysis as the touchstone for discrimination that
occurs on the basis of sex. The Court's precedents with respect to an intent
requirement are difficult to reconcile. Rather than attempting
reconciliation, the best approach would be to give up the search for intent,
and instead focus on whether the actors and institutions in question have
caused persons to be disadvantaged on the basis of sex. Sex discrimination
law is ill-suited to a legal standard that focuses on animus against women
or a discriminatory intent. Much sex inequality in American society has
been premised on a paternalistic protectionism rather than an explicit
ideology of inferiority or animus."6 In the real world, sex discrimination
frequently operates through institutional structures that enforce women's
inequality, rather than as a product of individuals acting out animus against
women. The Court's definition of intentional discrimination, as reflected
in Feeney, leaves out too much conduct that perpetuates sex inequality,
where proof of a conscious desire to harm women is lacking.
The move away from a discriminatory intent requirement in favor of a
causation-based analysis would better position discrimination law to
address the multi-faceted ways in which institutions perpetuate sex-based
inequality. Courts have been notoriously reluctant to attribute policies and
practices that disadvantage women to a discriminatory intent or motive. In
the context of peer sexual harassment, for example, cases decided prior to
Davis under an intent standard demonstrate the pitfalls of a legal test that
treats discriminatory intent as the linchpin of discrimination. While many
plaintiffs were able to survive motions to dismiss peer sexual harassment
complaints under this standard, in the final analysis, convincing a factfinder
does not actually require proof of a discriminatory motive to establish discrimination).
However, the Court's failure to require proof of intent in the affirmative action context can
be explained by the Court's general rule that proof of intent is not required in discrimination
cases challenging facial classifications. See UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187,
199 (1991) (ruling that "the absence of a malevolent motive does not convert a facially
discriminatory policy into a neutral policy with a discriminatory effect"). Thus, the intent
requirement is only potentially problematic in those cases that do not involve classifications
that facially differentiate on the basis of suspect criteria.
116. See generally BABARA ALLEN BABCOCK ET AL., SEx DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW:
HIsTORY, PRACTICE, AND THEORY 58-67, 100-108 (2d ed. 1996) (discussing rationales used
to justify early "protective" laws restricting women from the practice of law and from
working overtime).
that intentional sex bias ultimately motivated a school's failure to respond
to sexual harassment proved to be very difficult."7 The reluctance of courts
to attribute school inaction in the face of sexual harassment to a
discriminatory intent by school officials parallels the tendency of courts in
other contexts to exude a cautious reluctance to brand decision-makers as
intentional discriminators."18 As a result, the discriminatory intent standard
impedes the ability of discrimination law to remedy institutional actions
that disadvantage women on the basis of sex. By replacing the legal
inquiry into intent and animus with a more objective search for causation,
Davis represents a welcome move toward a more workable and
theoretically sound approach to discrimination." 9
Thus, the Davis decision is best seen as a modest step toward breaking
down a narrow, animus-based approach to discrimination and replacing it
with a standard that holds institutions accountable for causing sex-based
harm. Equally important, the Court's understanding of discrimination in
Davis sheds light on the related issue of how to judge whether an institution
that is subject to discrimination law "caused" discrimination. There is a
117. See, e.g., Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 140 F.3d 776, 780 (8th Cir. 1998)
(affirming district court ruling setting aside jury verdict for plaintiff because evidence did
not support an inference that the school district's response to plaintiffs sexual harassment
complaints was "impermissibly motivated by [her] sex"); Wright v. Mason City Community
Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (setting aside jury verdict for plaintiff
because she failed to prove that school district intentionally discriminated against her on the
basis of sex when it failed to adequately respond to the harassment). Not all Title IX claims
even got to juries on the question of the school's intent under this standard. See, e.g.,
Linson v. Trustees of Univ. of Pa., No. CIV.A.95-3681, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12243, at
*12-13 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 1996) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss Title IX claim on
the ground that plaintiff failed to show that the school district's "'inaction (or insufficient
action) in the face of complaints of student-to-student sexual harassment was a result of an
actual intent to discriminate against the student on the basis of sex') (quoting Doe v.
Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1576 (N.D. Cal. 1993), rev'd on other
grounds, 949 F. Supp. 1415 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir.
1996) (affirming defendant's successful motion to dismiss Title IX claim because plaintiff
failed to show that school's response to harassment reflected an intent to discrininate
against him on the basis of sex).
118. See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) (upholding district
court's finding of absence of intent to discriminate where supervisor engaged in a personal
crusade against black employee and employer gave pretextual reason for terminating the
employee that did not withstand scrutiny). See generally Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id,
the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317
(1987) (discussing the limits of a legal approach centered on conscious, intentional
discrimination, and analyzing the cultural and psychological forces that hinder
consciousness of bias).
119. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161,
1169 (1995) (criticizing the tendency of courts to conflate discriminatory intent with
causation of sex-based harm in Title VII law); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and
the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 956-64 (1989) (arguing that intentional
discrimination should be defined in terms of causation rather than discriminatory motivation
or animus).
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sharp division in the law between discrimination by third parties who are
not governed by discrimination laws and discrimination by actors and
institutions that are barred from discriminating.' Courts have often
enforced this line in a way that demonstrates their reluctance to find that a
covered entity engaged in discrimination by enabling, facilitating,
endorsing or giving added effect to discrimination by others.'
Perhaps the most famous example of judicial reluctance to hold actors
accountable for actions perceived as being more directly caused by others
is DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services.'2 In the
DeShaney case, the Court ruled that the failure of a state social services
agency to intervene to prevent the severe abuse of a child by his parent,
despite the agency's notice of the likelihood of such abuse and its
assumption of the responsibility to protect children from such abuse, did
not deprive the severely injured child of any right guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause. The key to the Court's ruling lay in its determination that
the child's parent, not the state, caused the deprivation of the child's
liberty. Although DeShaney involved a claim for violation of due process
rather than discrimination, the same state action requirement applies in
equal protection challenges to discrimination under the Fourteenth
Amendment." Similarly, statutes prohibiting discrimination apply only to
a limited set of actors who have an obligation to comply with the
substantive demands of the non-discrimination provision.' 4 Thus, the
DeShaney "problem" of cutting off causation where a third party initiates
the underlying harm is as potentially problematic in discrimination law,
120. See generally Frances Olsen, Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the
Public/Private Distinction, 10 CoNsT. CoMMENT. 319,321 (1993).
121. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (holding state's grant of
liquor license to private lodge which refused to serve blacks did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause); Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278 (1979) (holding
that the state's veteran's preference for civil service jobs did not discriminate against
women, even though the federal government had limited military service, and thus the
category of veterans, by sex; "the [federal government's] history of discrimination against
women in the military is not on trial in this case."); Soto v. Carrasquillo, 878 F. Supp. 324,
331-32 (D.P.R. 1995) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that the failure of the police to respond
to repeated reports of domestic violence could legally cause the harm because perpetrator's
violence would be an intervening cause); cf. Ellen M. Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules: Rape
Victims and Comparative Fault, 99 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1413, 1420 (1999) (discussing the
reluctance of courts to hold landlords, hotels and employers civilly liable to rape victims for
negligence in facilitating and failing to deter rape, as manifested in comparative fault rules
that enable such defendants to raise the defense that the rape victim's own conduct was the
legal cause of the rape).
122. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
123. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
124. The primary federal anti-discrimination statutes specify those actors and institutions
subject to the obligation not to discriminate. See, e.g., Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000)
(employers with fifteen or more employees); Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000)
(educational programs and activities receiving federal funds); Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(2000) (programs and activities receiving federal funds).
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constitutional or statutory, as it is under the Due Process Clause.
The most recent example of this problem in a discrimination context is
the Supreme Court's recent decision striking down the Violence Against
Women Act as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's power to enforce
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 25 In United
States v. Morrison, the Court viewed gender-motivated violence against
women as purely private conduct unconnected to the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantee of equal protection, despite evidence that state court
systems failed to respond to such crimes with sufficient seriousness.' 26 In
the view of the Court, only the assailant who engages in gender-motivated
violence causes discrimination; the state's failure to respond seriously to
that violence does not violate the anti-discrimination principle.
The Court's discrimination analysis in Davis provides an alternative to
the approach to causation taken in the DeShaney and Morrison decisions.
In contrast to these decisions, the Davis Court held schools accountable
under Title IX's anti-discrimination principle for effectively condoning the
discriminatory conduct of the harasser.'2 Had the Court in Morrison
employed an analysis similar to the one it adopted in Davis, it might have
recognized the states' role in causing secondary harm to the victims of
gender-motivated violence and encouraging the perpetrators of gender-
motivated violence, and therefore viewed the statute as intricately
connected with the Fourteenth Amendment's anti-discrimination
principle.'25 Instead, the Davis insight that institutions may "effectively
125. See Sally F. Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the Persistence of Privacy, 61
OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 40, 81-82 (2000) (discussing the Fourth Circuit's decision invalidating the
Act as a reflection of the court's view that violence against women is a private wrong, rather
than a form of sex discrimination by the institutions that condone it, and arguing that "[tihe
boundary between state and private action is far more porous than the conventional
definition of 'state action' acknowledges").
126. 529 U.S. 598, 603 (2000).
127. It is tempting to try to reconcile Davis and DeShaney by invoking the recognized
exception to the DeShaney rule that where a "special relationship" exists between the state
and the injured person, the state's failure to intervene may be said to cause the resulting
harm. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-23 (1982); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 104-105 (1976). However, courts have rejected the argument that mandatory school
attendance policies create a special relationship between schools and their students. See,
e.g., J.O. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 272-73 (7th Cir. 1990);
D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1371 (3d Cir. 1992).
As a result, a school's failure to intervene to stop peer harassment would not escape
DeShaney's application of the state action doctrine in an action alleging violation of the Due
Process Clause. See, e.g., Aurelia D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 62 F. Supp. 363, 365-
67 (M.D. Ga. 1994) (applying DeShaney rule to reject plaintiff's section 1983 claim and
rejecting special relationship argument), aff d in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 74
F.3d 1186 (1 1th Cir. 1996), vacated and aff'd en banc, 120 F.3d 1390 (1997), rev'd and
remanded on other grounds, 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
128. Cf. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States v.
Morrison, 114 HARV. L. REv. 135, 171-72 (2000) (chastising the Court for "obscur[ing] the
involvement of the state in impunity for male dominance and its collaboration with the
occurrence of violence against women society-wide," and noting that although "[m]ost
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cause" discrimination that is, in the first instance, initiated by others was
lost on the Court in Morrison.
Davis highlights the need to take a closer look at causation in cases
alleging institutional endorsement of discrimination. The DeShaney and
Morrison approaches are not the only models to work with in litigating and
deciding discrimination cases that involve complex questions of whether
the actor subject to discrimination law caused the discrimination. Perhaps
one key to the Court's broader view of causation in Davis is the presence in
that case of a discrete institution (a school) with immediate power over the
lives of both harassers and harassment victims. State social service
agencies and state criminal justice systems may be thought to be more
diffuse institutions than schools and workplaces in terms of their power to
inflict harm on discrimination victims and empower its perpetrators. Such
a distinction may or may not prove useful in trying to extend the Davis
causation analysis without being thwarted by the DeShaney and Morrison
holdings. Nevertheless, the Davis ruling should challenge scholars,
litigators and judges to think more deeply about the meaning of causation
in discrimination cases, rather than simply stopping the analysis because a
private party more immediately caused the harm. In this respect, the
decision's greatest significance may lie in its potential to enhance legal
accountability for institutional structures that effectively endorse and give
added effect to so-called "private" discrimination, particularly where the
expressive message conveyed by the institution itself has power over both
the persons harmed by and those who engage in discrimination.
CONCLUSION
Davis is a decision that implicates important questions about the
meaning of discrimination. It rejects an inquiry into the subjective animus
or bias of the decision-makers involved, while treating as intentional
discrimination a school's deliberate indifference in the face of known
sexual harassment by students. Yet, the deliberate indifference requirement
does not require any subjective intent of school officials other than their
subjective knowledge of the harassment, coupled with their objectively
insufficient response. In addition to the rejection of a subjective intent
standard, the Davis decision eschews narrower approaches to causation,
finding that schools in such cases cause their students to be subjected to
discrimination when they knowingly ignore discrimination by other
students. With this ruling, the Court has furthered the law's recognition
that institutional acquiescence in gender-based harm can serve as an active
instrument of sex inequality. Davis by no means solves the longstanding
violence against women is engaged in by non-state actors .... they do act with the virtually
total assurance that... their acts will be officially tolerated, they themselves will be
officially invisible, and their victims will be officially silenced.").
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problems of how to define and give significance to intent and causation in
discrimination law. But perhaps the glow that it casts on these issues can
lead to the development of new and useful accounts of the proper meaning
and role of intent and causation in discrimination law.
